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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
S T A T E O F U T A H , by and through
its R O A D C O M M I S S I O N ,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
W . R O Y B R O W N and E V E L Y N J .
B R O W N , his wife; V A L L E Y B A N K
& T R U S T COMPANY; ZIONS
BANK & TRUST; SOUTHLAND
C O R P O R A T I O N (7-11/Stores),
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
13742

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
THE SOUTHLAND CORPORATION

N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
This is a condemnation action by the State of
Utah, through its Road Commission, to acquire real
property along 5300 South Street in Salt Lake County
for the purpose of constructing an expressway.
1
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D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT
This matter was tried before a j u r y with the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppsen presiding. The j u r y returned a verdict in favor of the land owners in the
amount of $62,840.76 and in favor of the lessee of a
7-Eleven Store on the premises in the amount of
$15,767. I n addition, by a supplemental verdict, the
j u r y awarded damages to the lessee for the loss of fixtures and personal property which had been rendered
useless as a result of the taking, in the amount of $2,600. The j u r y found that of such amount, $1,400 was
for loss of personal property and $1,200 was for loss
of property that had been attached to the building.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-respondent The Southland Corporation,
the lessee of the property, seeks affirmance of judgment on the verdict.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Besides being mostly argumentative the State has
omitted from its statement of facts a number of matters
necessary to the court's determination. Consequently,
it is necessary for Southland to expand upon that
statement.
I t is undisputed that the building was built especially for the operation of a 7-Eleven Store and had
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not been used for any other purpose. (T. 149). The
change in grade, the limitation of access and particularly the reduction of the parking area, made it impossible to carry on the operation of such store after
the taking. (T. 160). Thus, though it may have been
a partial taking as to owners, it was a complete taking
as to their lessee. (T. 161-63). As the property was
in an expanding residential area and close to a large
apartment complex, it was a very desirable location
for the operation of a 7-Eleven store. Since having to
move from the property, Southland has been unable to
find another suitable location in the area. (T. 184).
There was only one witness, Mr. Jerry Webber,
who testified concerning the value of the leasehold. Although the other appraisal witnesses testified that the
method Mr. Webber used was the correct method for
determining the value of a leasehold interest (T. 146,
T. 270), they had not been asked to compute such value
and had not done so. (T. 269, T. 303, T. 326). Contrary to the State's contention that Mr. Webber was
willing to testify as to three separate values, he clearly
testified only as to one and merely computed what the
value would be assuming economic rent figures testified
to by the zone manager of Southland, Mr. E . L. Pack.
(T, 202, T. 225). I n addition to the taking of the
leasehold, a sign, which was stipulated to have a value
of $1,000, was taken by the State. (R. 431). Certain
other property utilized in the operation of the store
became entirely valueless. (T. 165, T. 171). A portion
of the property was attached to the building and a
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portion was not. (T. 173-74). The damages awarded
by the jury were lower than the figures testified to
by Mr. Pack, the only witness on this subject.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E EVIDENCE ADMITTED BY T H E
T R I A L COURT A N D T H E INSTRUCTIONS
GIVEN BY IT WERE PROPER AND DID
N O T R E S U L T I N A N A W A R D TO D E F E N D ANT T H E SOUTHLAND CORPORATION
E X C E E D I N G J U S T COMPENSATION.
Throughout these proceedings, the State has not
only adopted the attitude that it had no concern over
the value of the lease, but that the lessee itself could not
present independent evidence of its value. This "hands
off" approach is contrary to the eminent domain statutes of the State of Utah. Its implementation would,
in fact, make some provisions of the statutes entirely
meaningless. I n asserting the position that evidence of
value of the leasehold interest cannot be separately
given, the State relies on cases from jurisdictions involving different statutory provisions. These contemplate a separate hearing to determine values and to
apportion the award. The Utah statutes provide, however, for the entire determination at one hearing. Section 78-34-10 states:
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal
evidence as may be offered by any of the parties
4
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to the proceedings and thereupon must ascertain
and assess:
(1) The value of the property sought to be
condemned, and all improvements thereon appertaining to the realty, and of each and every
separate estate or interest therein; and if it consists of different parcels the value of each parcel
and of each estate or interest therein shall be
separately assessed. (Emphasis added.)
The language of Subparagraphs (4) and (5)
makes it even plainer that the various interests are to
be assessed separately. Section 78-34-10 is subject to
no other interpretation. The value of the separate
estates or interests taken are to be ascertained separately and that by the court or jury which hears the
evidence. Section 78-34-7 lends support to this conclusion. I t provides that all persons claiming an interest
in the property may defend "each in respect to his
own property or interest."
Thus, the State's contention that separate hearings should be had to determine the value of the leasehold interest is clearly inappropriate and the cases supporting that argument are clearly inapposite. Since
under the statute, the various interests are to be assessed
separately, and the only way that this can be done is
by producing evidence as to the value of the various
interests, the State's argument that the court erred in
admitting such evidence is without merit. (As will be
pointed out below; this does not mean that the various
interests need exceed the value of the whole). Since
it chose to offer no testimony as to the value of the
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leasehold interests and had instructed its three appraisers to make no such determination, it cannot complain that the only evidence on such value was that
presented by the lessee.
As pointed out by the State in its brief (p. 13),
all witnesses agreed that the rental under the lease,
"the contract rent," was substantially less than the
market value, "the economic rent," at the time of taking . Thus, it is indisputable that Southland, as lessee,
sustained a loss by the taking. Further, all of the witnesses who testified on the subject, including the state's
appraisers, agreed as to the accepted method for determining the value of that loss. As explained by Mr.
Webber (T. 176-77), the method is very simple. If
the economic rent exceeds the contract rent, the lessee
has sustained a loss. The difference, on a monthly
basis, is multiplied by the number of months remaining on the lease, and the total is reduced to present
value by means of tables, called Inwood Tables, recognized throughout the appraising profession.
Since there was no dispute that Southland had
sustained a loss or as to the equation used in determining that loss, and there was no refutation of the figures
that went into that equation, the verdict in favor of
Southland cannot be challenged by the State. Neither
Ogden City v. Stephens, 21 Utah 2d 336, 445 P.2d
703, (1968), nor the text cited therein, 29A C.J.S.,
Eminent Domain, §198, is at odds with Southland's
position; instead they support it. The Stevens case
holds only that the damages sustained by the tenant
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should be deducted from the total value of the taking.
That is exactly what was done in this case. Stevens,
by clear implication, rejects the argument of the State
that a second hearing should be held or that the lessee
cannot present independent evidence as to the value
of the leasehold.
Decisions in point and involving the same statutory
language are difficult to find. One such case, however,
is State ex rel. La Prade v. Carol, 114 P.2d 891 (Ariz.,
1941). The wording of the statute, which is identical
to Section 78-34-10, was:
The court or jury shall ascertain and assess: (1)
The value of the property sought to be condemned and all improvements thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate
estate or interest therein; if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and each
estate or interest therein shall be separately
assessed.
The Arizona Supreme Court, in holding that the
trial court had erred in failing to separately determine
the interests of the lessor and lessee stated:
* * * it will be seen that the statute recognizes
that if there are separate estates or interests in
the property, the damages must be separately
assessed to and apportioned between these interests.
#

#

#

I t is necessary, therefore, that the judgment be
reversed and the case be remanded for a new
trial upon the issue of damages for erosion, diversion of drainage, and loss of use as a cattle
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range, with instructions to apportion the damages for these elements between the owners of
the fee and of the leasehold of the land damaged
as their respective interests may appear. (Emphasis added.)
Another case is State v. Platte Valley Public
Power & Irrigation District, 23 N.W.2d 300 (Neb.,
1946). There the statute provided:
If the land taken is held under lease contract,
a finding shall be made as to the interest of the
owner in such lease contract and such value shall
be separately assessed. . . .
The Nebraska Supreme Court approved a measure of
compensation based on the sum of the value of the
separate interests. Citing both Nichols and Orgel, it
said:
I t appears from examination of the cases that
courts have held that the total amount to be paid
by the condemnor may be less than the value of
the separate interests, and generally that the sum
of the separate values of the divided interests
may not exceed the value of the whole, and that in
exceptional circumstances the damages to the
various interests, when added together, may exceed the value of the property as an unencumbered whole.
The court noted that some courts follow the rule
that the sum of the values of the divided interests may
not exceed the value of the unencumbered whole. I t
pointed out, however, that these courts have abandoned
the rule that the measure of compensation is what the
owner has lost and have instead applied a rule that the
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measure is what the taker has gained. I t concluded
that under the Nebraska statute, the jury must make a
finding both as to the value of the fee and the value
of the leasehold and that such values must be separately
assessed. I n arriving at its decision, the court quotes
from 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, §279, as follows:
According to some authorities, where two or
more persons have distinct interests or estates in
any particular parcel of land, the value of each
interest should be separately assessed, and this
may be done either by first ascertaining the
damages to the fee as if it were owned by one
person and unencumbered, and then apportioning that amount among all the estates and interests, or in the first instance by appraising
the value of each separate interest and thus ascertaining the entire value.
Another very interesting case is State Highway
Department v. Thomas, 154 S.E.2d 812, (Ga. 1967).
Regardless of which method the court chooses to
follow in the present case the State has no complaint.
Southland does not contend that the court must adopt
the ruling of the Nebraska or Georgia Supreme Courts
in order to sustain the judgment in the present case.
A review of the instructions and the form of verdict
given to the jury clearly show that it was instructed
not to add the separate interests together. The form of
jury verdict unambiguously told the jury to find the
total damages resulting from the taking, including severance damages, and to apportion that between the fee
owner and the lessee.

9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The State, nonetheless, complains of Instructions
12, 16, 16(b) and 17. A review of these instructions
readily discloses that its complaints are not well
founded. Instruction 12 relates primarily to reception
of expert testimony and is apparently objected to by
the State on the basis that it tells the jury that they
can accept the expert witness's opinion as to the value
of the leasehold interest. Instruction 16, in conformance
with the Utah statutes, merely tells the jury that they
must assess the damages to the fee owner and the
lessee separately. Instruction 17 advises them as to
the undisputed method of determining the value of the
leasehold interest. The instruction directly dealing with
the question is 16(b), and it plainly advised the jury
that they must first determine what the State must pay
for damages to the whole and then allocate that amount
between the two defendants. I t provided, for example:
You need not allocate the award between the
lessors and lessee until you decide the total
amount that should be paid by the State . . .
After determining what the State should pay
you then have the problem of allocating the
amount that the State pays to the two defendants, the lessors and lessee . . . Then said lessee
had a compensable interest in the property that
must be paid for out of the total charge made
against the State . . . (Emphasis added)
The State also complains about the court's refusal
to grant its requested instruction No. 37. This instruction, symbolizing the State's attitude that any
testimony regarding the leasehold interest is forbidden,
10
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flies directly in the face of the statutes which require
that the interests be separately assessed.
To follow the State's position would require that
the lessee in a condemnation action sit mute throughout the entire proceedings. I t contemplates that the
State will offer no evidence of leasehold value and
that neither may the lessee. Presumably the State
would make the same objection to the fee owner offering evidence of the leasehold value, but the fee owner
generally has no interest in protecting the lessee's
rights; their interests are often adverse. If the lessee
is not allowed to look after his own interests, no one
else will, and the statutory provisions will be effectively
emasculated. The State's inflexible attitude to the
contrary is not helpful to the resolution of condemnation cases, either in the settlement stage or at trial.
Southland's position is not contrary to any of the
eminent authorities cited in the State's brief. I t does
not ask that the value of its interest be tacked on to
the value of the fee owners (although some jurisdictions go that far), but only that it be allowed to offer
evidence regarding the leasehold interest to be deducted
from the value of the whole. The State has cited no
authorities to this court for the proposition that this
cannot be done. The statutes, and cases construing similar statutes, make it clear that this is not only a proper
procedure but that it is the only logical one to be followed.
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POINT II
T H E R E W E R E NO O T H E R R E V E R S IBLE ERRORS IN CONNECTION W I T H T H E
A W A R D TO S O U T H L A N D W H I C H W O U L D
R E Q U I R E T H I S COURT TO D I S T U R B T H E
JURY'S VERDICT.
The State complains of other alleged errors occurring during the course of the trial. In some cases the
complaints are contrary to the facts and unsupported
by the record. In other cases, they are not supported
by either argument or authorities. It, for example,
argues that Southland's appraiser, Mr. Webber, did
not recognize the correct valuation date. The record
throughout discloses that this is a completely erroneous
statement. On at least seven occasions Mr. Webber
testified that while the appraisal was made later, it was
adjusted back to December 22, 1971 (T. 193, T. 200,
T. 208, T. 220, T. 224, T. 233, T. 235). The practice
of making an appraisal of a later date and then adjusting the figures back to the date in question is a
common practice in the appraising profession and is
recognized by courts everywhere. See e.g., Ogden City
V. Stephens, 21 Utah 2d 336, 445 P.2d 703 (1968). I t
is true that Mr. Webber, in determining the number
of months left to run on the lease, used the date that
Southland actually was forced to abandon the premises,
but it is clear from his testimony that he made the
proper adjustments. In any event, had he not done so,
this would have benefited the State, not Southland.
12
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Complaint is also made that Mr. Webber worked
on the appraisal with his father. The State cites no
authority that this is improper practice, and indeed it
could not do so. Mr. Webber was distinctly qualified
as an expert appraisal witness, and the record is clear
that the testimony was his own (T. 231).
Nor is there any basis for complaint in the fact
that Southland furnished rental figures concerning
some of its other properties to the appraiser. Inasmuch
as Southland is the only one that operates 7-Eleven
Stores in the State of Utah and practically the only
one that operates convenience food stores in the State,
it would be the logical one to furnish such figures. In
fact, the State itself obtained figures regarding rental
values from Southland, and its appraisers used such
figures in their computations. (T. 334). In this regard,
the State's attorney improperly attempted to impeach
Mr. Webber's testimony by asking him if he had reviewed leases on other specified 7-Eleven locations
without advising the jury that these locations were not
under lease but were owned directly by Southland.
(T. 221, T. 332-34).
The States makes much of the fact that after testifying to the value of the leasehold taken by it, Mr.
Webber calculated what the value of the property
would be if Mr. Pack's testimony as to the economic
rent should be accepted. I t argues that Mr. Webber
was testifying as to three different figures. However,
the record clearly shows otherwise. As was recognized
by the trial court (T. 202), Mr. Webber was merely
13
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doing Mr. Pack's arithmetic. H e was applying the
recognized method for computing the value of a leasehold interest to figures supplied him by others. Both
Mr. Webber and the court made it clear to the jury
that this was not Mr. Webber's testimony as to value
(T. 202, T. 211, T. 225), and the jury's verdict made
it clear that they did not accept the higher figures. The
verdict was lower than any figure testified to, including
that of Mr. Webber. Thus, it is clear that the jury was
not misled as the State contends and in any event it is
certainly not grounds for reversing the judgment.
Finally, the State complains about several aspects
of Mr. Saxton's testimony. Mr. Saxton did not testify
for Southland. More importantly, whether his approach
is correct or incorrect, should have no effect upon the
award to Southland and should not result in its disturbance. Nonetheless, Southland believes that the
State's objections are either not well founded, or related to minor matters. In the latter category is the
complaint that Mr. Saxton did not define "fair market
value" or "highest and best use." Perhaps he did not in
manner of the State's witnesses—by rote—but his testimony as a whole establishes that he was aware of these
concepts. The State's principal argument regarding
Mr. Saxton's testimony appears to be that he increased
the value of the land because of the lease, and that he
should have decreased it. In making this argument, the
State confuses two concepts. In assessing the value of
the separate interests, when a lease is "favorable" to
the lessee, as this one was, the enhanced value to the
14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lessee is deducted from the value of the whole. All of
the witnesses, including Mr. Saxton, recognized this.
(T. 115). However, this does not mean that when considering the value of the whole, a long-term lease to a
highly solvent company cannot enhance such value. I t
is clear from Mr. Saxton's testimony that this is the
basis for his addition of a nominal eleven cents a foot
to the value of raw land. The State's contention that
his procedure is faulty "because it allows the parties to
establish their own market value" is incomprehensible.
Mr. Webber also testified that having a lease on the
property could be a favorable factor in determining its
value and this has been recognized in various decisions.
A case in point is Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Focc, 322 S.W.2d 81, (Ark. 1969), a condemnation action in which it was held that a lease may
be advantageous to both parties so that the combined
market value of their separate interests exceeds what
the property would be worth if the lease has not been
made, and in which the Arkansas Supreme Court held
that the separate interests of lessor and lessee should
not be disregarded. Another such case is State Highway Department v. Thomas, 154 S.E.2d 812, (Ga.
App. 1967).
The State's contention that the severance damages
awarded by the jury exceeds the severance damage
testimony at the trial is not accurate. As to Mrs.
Saxton's testimony, it is purely a matter of approach
or semantics. A review of testimony shows that he was
breaking down "severance damages" into two categories
15
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and that his testimony regarding such damages would
support a verdict considerably larger than that returned by the jury. Mr. Saxton put some items what
would ordinarily be called "severance damage" in the
value of the actual taking and this was demonstrated
by the State's attorney during the trial. (T. 105-6,
129). I n any event, the owner of the property, Mr.
Brown, testified to a severance damage figure substantially in excess of the jury's verdict. (T. 154).
Apart from whether the verdict was excessive as
to the fee owner and regardless of whether the evidence
supported that verdict, the award to Southland should
not be disturbed. The only testimony before the jury
regarding the damage to the leasehold was that presented by Southland. The State's witnesses, while refusing to testify as to the value, agreed that the procedure utilized by Southland's appraiser was the correct
procedure. Indeed, even in the State's brief, it does
not contend that the award to Southland is excessive,
but only that it should not have been separately assessed. This, Southland believes, has been demonstrated
to be an erroneous interpretation of the statute. If the
State felt that the award was excessive, it should have
put in evidence to that effect. However, it chose to
offer no evidence whatsoever as to the leasehold value.
There could be no argument that the jury's verdict was
not supported by the testimony as it was well within
the figures testified to. Consequently, whether or not
the verdict in favor of the fee owner is reversed, that
in favor of Southland should be allowed to stand. If
16
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the case should later be submitted to another jury for
determination of the value of the entire tract, it would
be a simple matter to subtract from the figure the damage to the lessee, Southland, without prejudicing the
rights of any other party.
POINT III

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING EVIDENCE AS TO THE VALUE
OF FIXTURES AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
RENDERED VALUELESS AS A RESULT OF
THE TAKING.
The taking by the State made it impossible to
continue the operation of the 7-Eleven store by Southland. As a result, certain fixtures and property became entirely valueless and had to be discarded. I t is
Southland's contention that under the eminent domain
statutes this loss is or should be compensable. The
trial court agreed and so instructed the jury. (R. 421).
The jury, by a supplemental verdict, awarded Southland $1,200 for property that was attached to the
building and $1,400 for property that was not. The
State contends that this is damage which a condemnee
has to endure and that it is not compensable under any
circumstances. I t also accuses the trial court of refusing to follow the law in this regard. (Appellant's brief
P . 29).
Southland submits that there is no law in the state
which was transgressed by the trial court here. The
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cases cited by the State do not so hold. Utah Road
Commission v. Hansen, 14 Ut.2d 305, 383 P.2d 917,
(1963), merely holds that the cost of removing retained
personal property from condemned realty is not compensable. State v. Papanikolas, 19 Ut.2d 153, 427 P.2d
749, (1967), if anything, supports Southland rather
than the State. There the court held that damages and
severance damages to fixtures on the property taken
by eminent domain were compensable. I t did not allow
compensation for those fixtures on property not actually taken, but in that case no lessee was involved. In
the present case, the taking as to Southland was in
fact a total taking. The property or fixtures attached
to the building were entirely lost to it. To refuse to
allow compensation would be in derogation of Article
1, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution, which prohibits the taking or damaging of private property for
public use without just compensation. A number of
cases have so recognized. For example in Wilkes v.
Iowa State Highway Commission, 172 N.W.2d 790,
(Iowa, 1969), it was held that allowance should be
made for personal property held by a lessee and used by
him in connection with the condemned land. The court
ruled that the lessee should recover for the loss or reduction in value of his personal property in order to
be made whole. See also, Interstate Finance Corporation v. Iowa City, 149 N.W.2d 308, (Iowa, 1967).
In Cooney Brothers v. State of New York, 24 N.Y.
2d 387, 248 N.E.2d 585, (N.Y., 1969), it was held that
a lessee in a condemnation action could recover for the
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loss of value of fixtures even though not located on the
property actually appropriated if their economic utility
is destroyed by the taking. A case holding that taking
is a total taking as to lessee when the property is no
longer usable for the purpose for which it was leased
is Esso Standard
Oil v. State, 181 N . Y . S . 2 d 578,
(1958). This is a case which also strongly supports
Southland with respect to its claim that its interests
should be separately assessed and the manner in which
the assessment should be made. The provisions in the
lease regarding condemnation are, in fact, almost identical to those in the present case.
T h e State complains that various figures regarding the value of the attached and unattached property
were testified to. There was testimony regarding the
original cost, value at the time of the taking and value
at the time Southland moved from the premises as to
both categories. This naturally resulted in several different figures. However, the j u r y was obviously not as
confused as the State's attorney. F o r example, it found
t h a t the value of the attached property lost to Southland was $1,200. Mr. P a c k had testified that the value
as of the date he terminated the building was $1,000
and t h a t this would be one-third higher as of the date
of the taking.
T h e State also argues that Mr. P a c k was allowed
to testify as to business operations and that he did not
know the difference between fixtures and personal property. Mr. Pack's testimony regarding business operations was preliminary and was directed toward showing
19
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that the operation of a 7-Eleven store on the property
was not feasible after the taking. Certainly, this was
competent evidence. The fact that he did not know the
legal distinction between fixtures and personal property is no reason to invalidate his testimony. The court
was correct in holding that this called for a legal conclusion. (T. 168).
Southland submits that in order to properly compensate it, the verdict for both the personal property
and the fixtures should stand. In any event, loss of the
fixtures is a compensable item, and since the amounts
have been determined separately by a supplemental
verdict, if this court should determine that either or
both are not compensable, the non-compensable portion can readily be eliminated.

CONCLUSION
The two-hearing approach advocated by the State
is not warranted under the Utah statutes. Is adoption
would not result in just compensation, but would preclude the admission of relevant evidence necessary to
arrive at just compensation where there are multiple
interests. Its adoption is not necessary to preclude the
court or jury from returning a verdict, which exceeds
a fair and equitable award. This can be accomplished,
as it was in this case, in one hearing.
I t is undisputed that Southland was forced out of
business by the taking. I t lost a lease which would have
run for another twenty-one years and it will have to
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pay at least $150 a month more for a comparable location over that period. Thus, it is readily apparent that
Southland sustained a considerable loss for which it
should be compensated.
The verdicts were not excessive and were supported
by substantial evidence. There was, in fact, no other
evidence as to the lessee upon which the jury could base
an award except that presented by the lessee. Such
evidence was in accord with established principals and
there is nothing to warrant reversal of the judgment
as to Southland, regardless of whether or not the total
award is deemed to be excessive. There were no other
procedural errors during the course of the trial which
would warrant reversal of the judgment. The jury's
verdict, being based upon substantial evidence and in
accordance with applicable law, should not be disturbed
by this court.
Respectfully submitted,
Ralph L. Jerman
B. L. Dart, J r .
Jerman & Dart
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
The Southland Corporation
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